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APPLICATION OF THE INTERFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATION




Suzy Smith worked for the magazine Health Zone for five years. She
originally started as a staff writer, and the company promoted her to the
position of an editor within the last year. In her fifth year at the company,
Suzy and her husband decided to start a family. Suzy became pregnant, and
when she delivered her baby later that year, she took twelve weeks of leave
covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") 1 to recuperate
from childbirth and to care for her newborn. Suzy's company authorized
her to take FMLA-protected leave because she satisfied FMLA guidelines:
she had been a Health Zone employee for at least twelve months, 2 and she
had worked for the company for at least 1,250 hours during the previous
twelve-month period. 3
Suzy promptly returned to Health Zone at the end of her twelve-week
leave. However, when she returned, she learned that the company was
downsizing, and her supervisor was forced to terminate one of the six edi-
tors at Health Zone. Ultimately, her supervisor chose to terminate Suzy.
Suzy subsequently brought an action against Health Zone claiming that the
company violated her FMLA rights by using her twelve-week leave as a
negative factor in considering whether to terminate her employment. In
determining the liability of Health Zone, the court may invoke one of two
provisions of the FMLA, each with different applications and each warrant-
ing a different outcome. This example illustrates one problem with the
FMLA.
* J.D., 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S., Psychology, University of Illinois Cham-
paign-Urbana 2001. The author would like to thank the Law Review staff and Professors Katharine
Baker, Carolyn Shapiro, and Martin Malin for their valuable guidance and comments.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
2. Id. § 261 l(2)(A)(i).
3. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii).
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Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 in order
to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families" and
"to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons." 4 To
ensure that employees suffer no adverse effects for taking FMLA-protected
leave, § 2615(a)(1)-(a)(2) prohibits employers from certain acts. More
specifically, § 2615(a)(1) ("interference provision") prohibits an employer
from "interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or deny[ing] the exercise of or the
attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the Act]."' 5 Section
2615(a)(2) ("discrimination provision") prohibits an employer from "dis-
charg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against any individual
for opposing any practice made unlawful under [the Act]."' 6 Together, these
provisions can be termed the "Prohibited Acts" provisions.
While the Act sets out these two provisions separately, courts have
failed to establish a clear standard for determining which provision is im-
plicated when an individual is subjected to an adverse employment action
for taking FMLA-protected leave.7 This body of caselaw typically involves
a fact pattern similar to that of Suzy Smith: a plaintiff files a claim stating
that her employment termination, occurring subsequent to her FMLA-
protected leave, is a violation of her FMLA rights. In these kinds of cases,
both of the Prohibited Acts provisions are at issue; however, while some
courts have concluded that an analysis of the interference provision gov-
erns this fact pattern, other courts have concluded that an analysis of the
discrimination provision is appropriate. 8
Part I of this Note details the legislative history of the FMLA, specifi-
cally pertaining to the Prohibited Acts provisions. This section will also
examine each of the standards used to determine a violation of the FMLA
under the interference provision and under the discrimination provision.
4. Id. § 2601(b)(I)-(b)(2).
5. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
6. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
7. See, e.g., Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying the interference provision to a claim alleging that the employer took the employee's FMLA-
protected leave into consideration in its decision to terminate her); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319,
1322-23, 1325 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying the discrimination provision to a claim alleging that the
employer retaliated against the employee for taking FMLA-protected leave).
8. For example, the Ninth Circuit stated,
We note that some circuits have invoked § 2615(a)(2) in cases similar to Liu's where the
plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action for taking FMLA protected leave. In
this circuit, however, we have clearly determined that § 2615(a)(2) applies only to employees
who oppose employer practices made unlawful by FMLA, whereas, § 2615(a)(1) applies to
employees who simply take FMLA leave and as a consequence are subjected to unlawful ac-
tions by the employer.
Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1133 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bachelder, 259 F.3d at
1124)).
[Vol 81:741
2006] THE INTERFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE FMLA 743
Part II of this Note will examine inconsistencies in the application of the
Prohibited Acts provisions between district and circuit courts, within the
individual circuit courts, and among all of the circuit courts. More specifi-
cally, Part II will focus on why some courts analyzing similar claims under
the FMLA have differed as to whether to invoke the interference provision
or the discrimination provision and as to which analysis to apply.
Part III of this Note will argue that such inconsistency among the
courts when analyzing such FMLA claims needs to be resolved. In doing
so, Part III will describe why the interference provision is the appropriate
and preferable provision to govern such claims. A statutory interpretation
of the Prohibited Acts provisions and relevant regulation warrants the con-
clusion that the interference provision governs such FMLA claims. The
interference provision is also preferable to the discrimination provision
because it grants broader protection to individuals and provides an easier
burden for the plaintiff to carry by not requiring a showing of intent. As a
matter of public policy, the courts should choose the provision with the
lower burden because claimants in this context are typically less savvy than
their employers. To support these assertions, Part III will apply each of the
two Prohibited Acts provisions to Suzy Smith's case and examine the dif-
fering results. Finally, Part III will argue that the interference provision is
preferable because an employer's conduct that does not necessarily fall
within the protections of the FMLA may nevertheless interfere with FMLA
rights.
I. HISTORY OF THE FMLA AND THE PROHIBITED ACTS PROVISIONS
A. Legislative History
The Family and Medical Leave Act was a long-awaited response to
the tensions between work and family in our society.9 The FMLA sought to
alleviate the "growing conflict between work and family by establishing a
right to unpaid family and medical leave for all workers covered under the
act." 10 Congress asserted that it is unfair to terminate an employee when he
is unable to work because of a serious illness." 1 Furthermore, lack of job
security because of a serious illness would pose a significant threat to sin-
gle-parent families and families depending on two incomes. 12 In light of
9. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 6.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Id,
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these concerns, Congress enacted the FMLA to achieve the dual purposes
of "balanc[ing] the demands of the workplace with the needs of families"'13
and "entitl[ing] employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons." 14
Specifically, the FMLA provides that eligible employees may take up to
twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-month period to care for their
own serious illnesses or for illnesses of family members. 15 Moreover, the
FMLA guarantees that the employee will be restored to the position of
employment that he or she held before taking the protected leave. 16
B. Prohibited Acts Provisions
In addition to providing substantive rights, the FMLA lists prohibited
acts to ensure that employees will not suffer an adverse employment action
for taking FMLA-protected leave. 17 Specifically, under the interference
provision, 18 "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to interfere with, re-
strain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided
under this subchapter."' 19 Under the discrimination provision,20 on the other
hand, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made
unlawful by this subchapter." 21 Congress modeled this provision after Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, as under the Civil Rights Act an employee is
protected from employer retaliation for opposing a practice protected under
that act. 22
1. Prescriptive Versus Proscriptive Rights
The FMLA grants eligible individuals both prescriptive and proscrip-
tive rights.23 The First Circuit first addressed these two categories in
Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp.24 As the Hodgens court explained, the
prescriptive rights of the FMLA include an eligible employee's entitlement
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in the following circumstances: when an
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000).
14. Id. § 2601(b)(2).
15. Id. § 2612(a)(1).
16. Id. § 2614(a)(1)(A).
17. Id. § 2615(a).
18. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
21. Id.
22. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 34 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 36.
23. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1998).
24. Id.
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employee has "a serious health condition that makes [him or her] unable to
perform the functions of [his or her] position; ' 25 to care for a spouse, son,
daughter, or parent who has such a health condition; 26 or because of birth,
adoption, or placement of a child in foster care. 27 In addition, upon return-
ing from FMLA-protected leave, an employee is entitled to be reinstated to
the position he or she held before taking leave or an equivalent position.28
Finally, an eligible employee is granted the substantive right to take inter-
mittent leave "when medically necessary." 29
In contrast, the court in Hodgens described proscriptive rights as those
that protect an employee who has been discriminated against for exercising
his or her substantive FMLA rights.30 Such proscriptive rights are outlined
in the interference and discrimination provisions of the FMLA.31 The court
referenced the relevant portions of the Code of Federal Regulations in de-
termining that the proscriptive rights of the FMLA prohibit employers from
"discriminating against employees.., who have used FMLA leave, '32 and
prohibit employers from "us[ing] the taking of FMLA leave as a negative
factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions, or disciplinary
actions. ' 33 Therefore, when the plaintiff in Hodgens brought an action
against his employer claiming that his FMLA rights were violated when it
terminated him shortly after taking protected leave, the court stated that the
FMLA's proscriptive rights were at issue.34
However, according to the Seventh Circuit in King v. Preferred Tech-
nical Group, the interference provision of the FMLA is both a prescriptive
and proscriptive right. 35 Here, the court stated that the interference provi-
sion insured the availability of substantive guarantees such as the right to
take unpaid leave of up to twelve weeks in a twelve-month period and the
right to be reinstated to the same or an equivalent position.36 Yet, the court
also referred to the FMLA's interference provision as a protective right
25. Id. at 159 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(I)(D)).
26. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)).
27. ld. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(B)).
28. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)).
29. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)).
30. Id. at 159-60.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 160 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005)).
33. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c))
34. Id. at 160.
35. 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999).
36. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1), 2614(a), 2615(a)(1) (2000)).
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along with the discrimination provision.37 Because the FMLA bars dis-
crimination, the King court stated that the Prohibited Acts provisions were
proscriptive in nature.38 Thus, in King, the plaintiff claimed that her termi-
nation subsequent to FMLA-protected leave violated her FMLA rights, 39
and the court analyzed the plaintiffs claim as one falling under the
FMLA's proscriptive rights.40
2. Standards of Analysis
One significant concern in the application of the Prohibited Acts pro-
visions is that each provision warrants a different standard of analysis
which, in many cases, leads to a different outcome. For example, a court
invoking the interference provision uses a preponderance of the evidence
standard, which assesses whether the plaintiff has established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the FMLA-protected leave constituted a nega-
tive factor in the decision to terminate. On the other hand, a court using the
discrimination provision applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework, discussed in more detail below.
Initially, the Seventh Circuit applied a strict liability standard when
invoking the interference provision.41 In Kaylor v. Fannin Regional Hospi-
tal, Inc., the court stated that although the legislative history was silent on
the appropriate standard to be used for claims under the interference provi-
sion, the plain meaning of "shall be unlawful" used in the text of the provi-
sion warranted a strict liability standard.42 Therefore, when invoking the
interference provision, the court in Kaylor did not consider the subjective
intent of the employer when it allegedly violated the employee's FMLA
rights.43 Under the strict liability standard, the plaintiff need only show that
he possesses a statutory right created by the FMLA that the employer vio-
lated.44
Despite the strict liability standard applied in Kaylor, the prevailing
standard applied to the interference provision is the preponderance of the
37. Id. ("In addition to the substantive guarantees contemplated by the Act, the FMLA also affords
employees protection in the event they are discriminated against for exercising their rights under the
Act." (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2))).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 890-91.
40. Id. at 891.
41. Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l. Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
42. Id. at 996 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)).
43. Id. at 997.
44. Id.
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evidence standard.45 In Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., the Seventh
Circuit rejected the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis and the strict liability standard to interference claims and instead
adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard.46 Under this standard,
a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "her taking
of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to
terminate her."'47
On the other hand, when courts invoke the discrimination provision of
the FMLA, they apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework,
which takes the employer's motivation into consideration. 48 In the FMLA
context, courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework when there is no
direct evidence of discrimination on the part of the employer.49 This ap-
proach is a three-step process in which the plaintiff carries the initial bur-
den of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. 50
Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts
to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for the employee's termination. 51 Finally, if the employer succeeds on this
point, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must show that the em-
ployer's stated reason for the termination was pretextual. 52
Because each Prohibited Acts provision prompts a different standard
of analysis, FMLA claims with similar fact patterns often have conflicting
results depending on which provision the court chose to apply. In order to
promote uniformity in this area of the law, the courts should be consistent
in determining the appropriate provision and standard of analysis when
confronted with similar FMLA claims.
45. See e.g., Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2003); Bachelder v. Am.
W. Airlines, Inc. 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001); Rankin v. Seagate Techs., Inc. 246 F.3d 1145,
1148-49 (8th Cir. 2001); O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1353-54 (1 th
Cir. 2000); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711,713 (7th Cir. 1997).
46. Diaz, 131 F.3d at 713.
47. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125.
48. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We follow that lead
and hold that, when there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell-Douglas burden-
shifting framework applies to claims that an employee was discriminated against for availing himself of
FMLA-protected rights.").
49. See, e.g., id.; Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 n.3 (10th Cir. 1997).
50. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 804.
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II. INCONSISTENCY AMONG THE COURTS
The inconsistency as to which provision-and therefore which stan-
dard-to apply exists between the district and circuit courts, within the
individual circuit courts, and among all of the circuit courts. This section
will first examine a case in which the circuit court rejected the district
court's analysis, trading the McDonnell Douglas approach for the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard. Next, this section will analyze represen-
tative intra-circuit splits on the issue. This section will then evaluate the
inter-circuit splits.
A. District Court-Appellate Court Split
Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp. presents an example in which a
district court applied one provision of the Prohibited Acts provision, and on
appeal, the circuit court affirmed based on an analysis of the other provi-
sion.53 In Diaz, the plaintiff filed a claim against his employer for terminat-
ing him subsequent to his taking FMLA-protected leave.54 After being
diagnosed with bronchitis, the plaintiff took one month of FMLA-protected
leave. 55 However, the plaintiff failed to return on the day his leave ended
and instead called to inform his employer that he would not be returning
because he suffered from a number of other illnesses. 56 After receiving a
series of conflicting information from the plaintiffs two physicians, the
employer directed the plaintiff to report for a physical examination. 57 The
plaintiff failed to do so and was ultimately terminated. 58
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer.59 It invoked the discrimination provision of the FMLA and there-
fore applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to determine
whether the employer was liable.60 Under this analysis, the plaintiff had the
burden of establishing a prima facie case such that "(1) he was protected
under the FMLA; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) he
was treated less favorably than employees who did not avail themselves of
53. 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 712.
55. Id. at 711.
56. Id.
57. Id. 711-12.
58. Id. at 712.
59. Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry, Corp., No. 1:96-CV-207, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 1997)
ajfd on other grounds, 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997).
60. Id. at 13, 17. (applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and requiring
plaintiff to make a prima facie case of discrimination and to show that defendant's reason for termina-
tion was pretext for discrimination).
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the act or that the adverse decision was a result of his invocation of the
act."' 61 If the plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case, the bur-
den shifted to the employer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the termination. 62 Finally, if the employer's reason was legitimate, the
burden shifted back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the employer's reason was pretextual. 63 The district court held
that the defendant did not violate the FMLA for terminating the plaintiff
because the employer presented two non-pretextual reasons for the termina-
tion.64 First, the plaintiff failed to comply with the proper reporting proce-
dures permitted under the FMLA, and second, the plaintiff failed to appear
at a medical examination at the defendant's request.65
The plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary
judgment but rejected the district court's analysis.66 Because the plaintiff
did not claim to be a victim of discrimination, the circuit court rejected the
discrimination element in the plaintiff s case and instead relied on the inter-
ference provision of the FMLA. 67 Furthermore, the circuit court found that
the McDonnell Douglas approach was inappropriate under the FMLA be-
cause FMLA claims do not depend on discrimination. 68 Rather, the FMLA
creates substantive rights and requires that employers "honor statutory
entitlements" and "accommodate rather than ignore particular circum-
stances."169 The court likened the FMLA to the National Labor Relations
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Employee Retirement and In-
come Security Act, none of which adopt the McDonnell Douglas ap-
proach.70 Despite the circuit court's disagreement with the district court's
analysis, the circuit court affirmed the judgment that the employer was not
liable. 71 The employer had exercised its right to designate a physician to
examine the plaintiff under § 2613(c) of the FMLA, and because the plain-
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id. (citing Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 1001 (N.D. Ga. 1996)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 15-16.
65. Id.
66. Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 713 ("The FMLA does have an anti-discrimination component: 'It shall be unlawful for
any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any
practice made unlawful by this subchapter.' 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). But Diaz does not say that he is a
victim of discrimination in this sense.").
68. Id. at 712.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 712-13.
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tiff failed to appear for the examination, he forfeited his FMLA rights to
avoid termination. 7
2
Although the defendant in Diaz was found not liable according to both
the district court and the circuit court, this case demonstrates the different
standards used in the analyses of claims under the interference provision as
opposed to the discrimination provision. Because an analysis of the inter-
ference provision does not require a showing of the employer's intent, an
employer could be found not liable under one analysis (i.e., preponderance
of the evidence) but liable under another (i.e., McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework) depending on how the court analyzes the claim. In the
interest of a uniform interpretation of a federal statute, courts should em-
ploy one uniform way of analyzing such FMLA claims so that an em-
ployer's fate is not left to the whim of a particular court.
B. Intra-Circuit Splits
1. The Seventh Circuit
Although the Seventh Circuit in Diaz held that the plaintiffs claim
implicated the interference provision and therefore applied a preponderance
of the evidence standard, two years later the Seventh Circuit relied on the
discrimination provision in King v. Preferred Technical Group, a case with
similar facts. 73 In King, the defendant employed the plaintiff as an assem-
bly packer.74 In June of 1996, after being diagnosed with sarcoidosis, the
plaintiff took FMLA-protected leave.75 The plaintiff was granted five ex-
tensions during her leave period, yet she failed to return to work on her
scheduled August 1996 return date. 76 Pursuant to the employee union's
collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiff was terminated the following
day.77 However, the plaintiff alleged that she was terminated because she
followed orders from her manager not to return to work until her missing
doctor's slips could be accounted for.
78
In both Diaz and King, the plaintiffs took FMLA-protected leave,
failed to return on the scheduled return date, and consequently were fired.79
72. Id. at 713 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (2000)).
73. 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 889.
75. Id. at 890.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 889-90.
78. Id. at 890.
79. Id.; Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1997).
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However, in King, the court evaluated the plaintiff's claim as one falling
under the discrimination provision and therefore applied the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 80 The King court distinguished Diaz by
stating that King claimed that her employer discriminated against her when
it took an adverse employment action against her for having exercised an
FMLA right.81 This kind of an alleged retaliatory discharge claim looks to
the employer's intent and, consistent with anti-discrimination laws, applies
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 82 On the other hand, the
court in King stated that the plaintiffs claim in Diaz alleged a deprivation
of a substantive FMLA guarantee rather than discrimination in the sense of
the discrimination provision, and therefore Diaz analyzed the claim under
the interference provision.83 Furthermore, the court stated that while Diaz
implicated the interference provision and thus applied the preponderance of
the evidence standard, Diaz left open the possibility of applying the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to cases in which the court
invoked the discrimination provision.
84
2. The Eleventh Circuit
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has treated similar
FMLA claims differently. In O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc.,
the defendant hired the plaintiff as an account executive in March of 1995,
and the plaintiff took pregnancy leave pursuant to the FMLA from late
April to August of 1996.85 In June of that year, while the plaintiff was on
leave, the defendant listed her as an employee to be terminated as a result
of a compelled reduction in force. 86 The plaintiff learned of her termination
while she was on leave and subsequently filed a claim alleging a violation
80. 166 F.3d at 891-92.
81. Id. at 891.
82. Id. at 891-92.
83. Id. at 892 n. 1. The King court explained,
In Diaz, we foreclosed the extension of the McDonnell Douglas framework to cases in which
an employee alleges a deprivation of the FMLA's substantive guarantees by an employer.
Such claims do not turn on an employee's ability to demonstrate some sort of discriminatory
animus by the employer and, as stated, simply turn on the employee's ability to demonstrate
entitlement to the guarantees. Although we stated that "[w]e shall continue to resolve suits
under the FMLA... by asking whether the plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that he is entitled to the benefit he claims," we reserved judgment on whether it
would be appropriate to extend the McDonnell Douglas framework to retaliatory discharge
cases brought pursuant to the FMLA such as the one presently before us.
Id. (citing Diaz, 131 F.3d at 712-13) (internal citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. 200 F.3d 1349, 1350-51 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 1351.
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of the FMLA. 87 The court found that although the plaintiff did not classify
her claim as falling under either the interference or discrimination provi-
sions, she provided sufficient evidence to support a cause of action under
both provisions. 88 Reviewing her FMLA interference claim, the court held
that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
employer interfered with her rights by failing to reinstate her because she
never challenged the district court's finding that she was terminated as part
of the first phase of the employer's reduction in force.
89
Like O'Connor, both Prohibited Acts provisions were at issue in
Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.; however, the Brungart
court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.90 In
Brungart, the defendant employed the plaintiff as a service representative,
and the plaintiff was granted FMLA leave in May or June of 1997 to have
knee surgery.91 The plaintiffs manager was unaware of the plaintiffs
scheduled FMLA leave, and he terminated her one day before she was to
begin the requested leave for failing to meet the defendant's adherence
requirements. 92 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had interfered with
her FMLA rights.93 However, in her brief, the plaintiff characterized her
claim as one of retaliation.94 Although neither of the Prohibited Acts pro-
visions uses the term "retaliation," the court found that both provisions
were at issue because the meanings of interference, discrimination, and
retaliation are the same in this context: "[A]n employer may not do bad
things to an employee who has exercised or attempted to exercise any
rights under the statute. ' '95 The court relied on both the interference and
discrimination provisions but applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. 96 In doing so, the court held that the plaintiff failed to
show a causal connection between her termination and her request for leave
because the decision-maker of her termination was not even aware of her
request for leave. 97
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1352, 1353 n.10 (deciding not to review plaintiff's retaliation claim under the McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting framework because she did not appeal her retaliation claim).
89. Id. at 1353-54 (holding that an employee must prove her interference claim under the FMLA
by a preponderance of the evidence (citing Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 713 (7th
Cir. 1997))).
90. 231 F.3d 791, 797-98, 798 n.5 (11 th Cir. 2000).
91. Id. at 793-94.
92. Id. at 794.
93. Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 798 n.5.
96. Id. at 798.
97. Id. at 800.
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Although the plaintiff in O'Connor did not classify her claim as either
one of interference or discrimination, the court decided that her claim fell
under both provisions.98 Furthermore, the court in O'Connor separated the
retaliation claim from an interference claim by analyzing the retaliation
claim as one of discrimination. 99 On the other hand, the plaintiff in Brun-
gart claimed that her employer interfered with her FMLA rights, but she
classified her claim as one of retaliation. 100 Although the plaintiff did not
mention discrimination in her claim, the court decided that the discrimina-
tion provision nevertheless applied, in addition to the interference provi-
sion. 101 In sum, the court in O'Connor clearly distinguished the
discrimination and interference provisions when confronted with a retalia-
tion claim; but in Brungart, decided the same year as O'Connor, the court
lumped the two Prohibited Acts provisions together when analyzing a re-
taliation claim.
Both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits exemplify the confusion
within individual circuits associated with the application of the Prohibited
Acts provisions. Although individual circuits often disagree among each
other, the first step in resolving inconsistencies among the circuits is for
each circuit to adopt a uniform approach. This resolution may be realized in
one of two ways: (1) by requiring the circuit courts to determine which
provision should govern such FMLA claims; or (2) by requiring plaintiffs
to clearly and specifically plead one or both of the provisions rather than
asking the court to decipher a complaint's vague language.
C. Inter-Circuit Splits
In addition to various intra-circuit splits, the discrepancy exists among
the circuits. While most of the individual circuits are settled in their FMLA
jurisprudence with respect to the Prohibited Acts provisions, the various
circuits are in conflict with each other. Hence, seminal cases from the First
and Tenth Circuits decide FMLA claims under the discrimination provision
whereas the Eighth and Ninth Circuits rely on the interference provision. 102
The Fifth and the D.C. Circuits take an altogether different approach by
98. O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
99. Id. at 1353 n.10.
100. 231 F.3dat 797-98.
101. Id. at 798 n.5.
102. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 (1st Cir. 1998); Morgan v. Hilti,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 n.3 (10th Cir. 1997); Rankin v. Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1147-48
(8th Cir. 2000); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
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invoking the interference provision while applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework in its analysis of such FMLA claims.103
1. Circuits That Invoke the Discrimination Provision
The first influential case to apply the discrimination provision of the
FMLA to employment termination claims was Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., a 1997
Tenth Circuit case. 104 In Morgan, the plaintiff claimed that her employer
terminated her in retaliation for exercising her FMLA rights when she took
protected leave to recover from a surgical procedure. 105 The plaintiff filed
her claim under the Prohibited Acts section of the FMLA but did not spec-
ify whether she relied on the interference or discrimination provision.106
Following the analysis of the Northern District of Georgia in Kaylor, the
Morgan court regarded the plaintiffs claim as one of discrimination and
therefore applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. 107 In
doing so, the court concluded that although the plaintiff established a prima
facie case for discrimination, the defendant cited excessive absenteeism as
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination, which the plaintiff
could not sufficiently oppose. 108
The year after Morgan the First Circuit in Hodgens v. General Dy-
namics Corp. invoked the discrimination provision of the FMLA when
confronted with a plaintiff who had been terminated subsequent to FMLA
leave. 10 9 The plaintiff in Hodgens began his career with the defendant in
1964.110 From August of 1993 to December 1993, the plaintiff took two
separate leaves for treatment of angina and ear surgery protected under the
FMLA, and in April of 1994, his request for a third leave for a family
emergency was denied. 111 In May of 1994, the defendant terminated the
plaintiff for lack of work and because Hodgens's performance had been
ranked seventh out of the seven members of his group for the year. 1 2 The
plaintiff alleged an FMLA violation, claiming that the defendant had taken
103. See, e.g., Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999).
104. 108 F.3d at 1323 n.3.
105. Id. at 1322-23.
106. Id. at 1325.
107. Id. at 1323; see also Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 1000 (N.D. Ga.
1996) (applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shiffing framework to an FMLA retaliation claim
"because it can most accurately balance providing employees a broader basis for proving an employer
violated the FMLA while also protecting the interests of the employers.").
108. Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1325.
109. 144F.3d 151,158-60(lstCir. 1998).
110. Id. at 156.
111. Id. at 156-58.
112. Id. at 158.
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an adverse employment action against him because he had taken FMLA-
protected leave. "13
The court analyzed the plaintiff's claim under the discrimination pro-
vision of the FMLA because his termination "was prompted by the fact that
he took sick leave to which he was entitled under the statute.""11 4 Further-
more, the court stated that an analysis of the discrimination provision was
appropriate because the plaintiff had not alleged a violation of a substantive
right, such as a denial of medial leave, nor had his employer refused to
reinstate him after he returned from leave. 115 However, the court acknowl-
edged the overlap between the interference and discrimination provi-
sions. 116 In its discussion of the proscriptive group of FMLA violations,
where an employer is prohibited from discriminating against an employee
who has taken FMLA leave, the court stated that proscriptive protection
could also be read into the interference provision.' 17 More specifically, the
court asserted that "to discriminate against an employee for exercising his
rights under the Act would constitute an 'interfer[ence] with' and a 're-
strain[t]' of his exercise of those rights."
'"18
2. Circuits That Invoke the Interference Provision
Although the First and Tenth Circuits are consistent in invoking the
discrimination provision when confronted with FMLA claims, the Eighth
and Ninth circuits invoke the interference provision when reviewing such
FMLA claims.' '9 In 2001, the Eighth Circuit applied the interference pro-
vision to a plaintiffs claim that she was denied her substantive FMLA
rights.120 In Rankin v. Seagate Technologies, Inc. the plaintiff, due to an
illness, was absent from work on a number of occasions, and she continu-
ally updated her employer on her condition with doctors' notes indicating
when she would be able to return to work. 121 During this time, the defen-
dant terminated the plaintiff for excessive absenteeism. 122 The court ac-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 159-60.
115. Id. at 160 n.5.
116. Id. at 159-60, 160 n.4.
117. Id. at 160 n.4.
118. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (2005)).
119. See Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2001); Rankin v.
Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001).
120. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124 (citing Rankin, 246 F.3d at 1148) ("[Rankin held] that a claim by
a former employee that [s]he was denied the use of FMLA leave is a claim of a substantive right, cov-
ered under (a)(l), and not (a)(2)."). Although the Rankin court did not explicitly state that it was refer-
ring to the interference provision, this can be inferred.
121. Rankin, 246 F.3d at 1146-47.
122. Id. at 1147.
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knowledged that while other courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework to substantive claims under the FMLA, the
plaintiff's claim that she suffered from a serious health condition covered
by the FMLA should be analyzed under an objective test. 123 The court thus
followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Diaz that FMLA claims do not
depend on discrimination; thus, because the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is designed for anti-discrimination laws, applying McDonnell Doug-
las to such an FMLA claim is misleading. 124 Applying an objective test
that looks to the weight of the evidence, the court held that although the
plaintiff had not produced an "overabundance of evidence," she had pro-
vided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to her
illness. 125
Shortly after Rankin was decided, the Ninth Circuit followed suit in
Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc. by applying the interference pro-
vision to the plaintiff's FMLA claim. 126 In Bachelder, between 1994 and
1996 the plaintiff took three FMLA-protected leaves, and she also called in
sick several times during that period. 127 In 1996, the plaintiffs employer
terminated her because, along with other performance-related reasons, she
had been absent sixteen times after being counseled for her absenteeism. 128
In analyzing the plaintiffs claim that her termination violated the FMLA,
the court looked to the relevant regulation which states that "employers
cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment
actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions." 129 The court
determined that this regulation was an interpretation of the interference
provision of the FMLA and therefore found that an analysis under the inter-
ference provision was appropriate.130
Although the relevant regulation refers to "discrimination" as opposed
to "interference" or "restraint," 131 the court concluded that by its plain
meaning the interference provision, as opposed to the discrimination provi-
sion, governed claims in which protected leave was used as a negative fac-
tor in an employee's termination. 132 Acknowledging the confusion among
123. Id. at 1148.
124. Id. (citing Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997)).
125. Id. at 1148-49.
126. 259 F.3d 1112, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 1121.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1122 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005)).
130. Id. at 1122-23.
131. Id. at 1124; 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) ("An employer is prohibited from discriminating against
employees or prospective employees who have use FMLA leave.") (emphasis added).
132. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
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the circuits in the application of the Prohibited Acts provisions, the court
noted that courts that apply the discrimination provision have done so erro-
neously by using the term "discriminate" to refer to an interference
claim. 133 In resolving the plaintiffs claim, the court determined that the
McDonnell Douglas approach was inapplicable to a claim falling under the
interference provision, and the court instead analyzed the claim under a
preponderance of the evidence test.134 Ultimately, the court held that the
plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her FMLA-
protected leave constituted a negative factor in her employer's decision to
terminate her. 13
5
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit again applied the interference provi-
sion to an FMLA claim pursuant to a plaintiff s employment termination in
Xin Liu v. Amway Corp. 136 Xin Liu is significant because it clearly identi-
fies the inconsistencies among the courts with respect to the Prohibited
Acts provisions of the FMLA. 137 In Xin Liu, the plaintiff claimed that her
employer interfered with her FMLA rights by using her protected leave as a
negative factor in her termination. 138 As in Bachelder, the court rejected
the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard because
the claim was not based on an employee's opposition to an employer's
unlawful practices. 139 Instead, the plaintiff claimed that she was subjected
to negative consequences simply because she has used FMLA leave, and
that the employer had therefore interfered with her FMLA rights.140 Apply-
ing the preponderance of the evidence standard set forth in Bachelder, the
court held that the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that her protected
leave constituted a negative factor in her termination, and thus her em-
ployer interfered with her FMLA rights. 14 1
133. Id. at 1124&n.10, 1125.
134. Id. at 1124-25.
135. Id. at 1125, 1132.
136. 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).
137. Id. at 1133 n.7. The court stated,
We note that some circuits have invoked § 2615(a)(2) in cases similar to Liu's where the
plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action for taking FMLA protected leave. In
this circuit, however, we have clearly determined that § 2615(a)(2) applies only to employees
who oppose employer practices made unlawful by FMLA, whereas, § 2615(a)(1) applies to
employees who simply take FMLA leave and as a consequence are subjected to unlawful ac-
tions by the employer.
Id. (citing Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124).
138. Id. at 1133.
139. Id. at 1136 (citing Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125).
140. Id. at 1133.
141. Id. at 1135-37.
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3. Circuits That Invoke the Interference Provision Yet Apply Anti-
Discrimination Analysis
To complicate matters even further, the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Cir-
cuit take a completely different approach from the circuits discussed above.
Whereas the circuits discussed above either invoked the interference provi-
sion and applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, or invoked the
discrimination provision and applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework, the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit do neither.
Rather, these circuits use the McDonnell Douglas framework to govern an
interference claim under the FMLA.
For example, the Fifth Circuit invoked the interference provision of
the FMLA in Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co. 142 The plaintiff in Chaffin
worked as a programmer for the defendant, and she took FMLA-protected
leave to treat her depression. 143 Upon returning to work after five weeks of
paid leave, the defendant terminated the plaintiff because she had given no
explanation as to why she had been drinking at a bar while on leave. 144 The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant terminated her in retaliation for taking
FMLA-protected leave, although she did not classify her claim under either
the interference or discrimination provision of the FMLA. 145 The court
cited the interference provision as the proscriptive FMLA right at issue, but
both parties agreed that the claim should be analyzed under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 146 Such an FMLA claim was one of first impression
in the Fifth Circuit circuit, and the court followed its sister circuits in ap-
plying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework "to claims that
an employee was penalized for exercising rights guaranteed by the
FMLA."'147 However, the court neglected to consider that the other circuits
had applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to claims falling under the
discrimination provision of the FMLA, rather than the interference provi-
sion.
Following the Fifth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit in Gleklen v. Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, Inc. similarly invoked the interfer-
ence provision yet applied the McDonnell Douglas framework. 148 In Glek-
len, the plaintiff had a job-sharing arrangement in which she worked part-
142. 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999). The court incorrectly cited the interference provision as
§ 2615(a)(2) instead of § 2515(a)(1).





148. 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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time for the previous year. 149 Shortly after the plaintiff informed the defen-
dant that she was pregnant with her third child, the defendant increased the
work hours of the staff and requested that the plaintiff return to work full-
time on April 1, 1997.150 When the plaintiff failed to appear that day, the
defendant fired her and replaced her with a woman who was not preg-
nant. 15 1
The plaintiff filed a claim under the FMLA, and the court stated that
her claim was "essentially one of retaliation."' 152 Then, the court invoked
the interference provision and stated that other circuits had concluded that
the McDonnell Douglas framework governed such claims. 153 The court
cited Chaffin to support its use of the McDonnell Douglas analysis for the
plaintiffs claim despite the fact that this framework is typically applied in
discrimination claims. 154 Applying McDonnell Douglas, the court held that
although the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination,
the defendant presented reasonable and nondiscriminatory reasons for re-
quiring her to work full time. 155
The inconsistency among the circuits in applying the interference and
discrimination provisions is notable and warrants the need for resolution.
The FMLA was created in order to protect individuals entitled to leave
from adverse employment actions. However, the full extent of this protec-
tion can only be realized if courts are consistent in analyzing such claims.
111. RESOLUTION OF THE INCONSISTENCY
When an individual files a lawsuit against her former employer for
terminating her as a result of taking leave protected by the FMLA, the law
should be clear and consistent as to whether this claim invokes the interfer-
ence or discrimination provision of the FMLA. As outlined above, the
courts are conflicted on this issue. As a result of this conflict, some indi-
viduals prevail on a lower standard of proof under the interference provi-
sion (i.e., the preponderance of the evidence standard), while other
individuals' virtually identical claims fail where a court likens their claims
to discrimination and imposes a steeper burden under McDonnell Douglas.
149. Id. at 1366-67.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1367.
152. Id. at 1367-68.
153. Id. at 1367 (citing Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co. 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999)).
154. Id. (citing Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319); but see, e.g., King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166
F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to discrimination
claim under FMLA); Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 (lst Cir. 1998) (same).
155. Gleklen, 199 F.3d at 1368.
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This section will explore why the courts should invoke the interference
provision and hence the preponderance of the evidence standard when a
plaintiff alleges that she has suffered an adverse employment action as a
result of taking FMLA-protected leave.
A. Statutory Interpretation of the FMLA: The Interference Provision
Should Govern
An interpretation of the plain meaning of the Prohibited Acts section
of the FMLA led the court in Bachelder v. America West Airlines, Inc. to
determine that the interference provision is the appropriate provision to
govern the FMLA claims discussed in this Note. 156 Although the relevant
regulation uses the term "discrimination" as opposed to "interference"
when prohibiting the use of FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor in
employment decisions, the Bachelder court maintained that the issue is one
of interference, not discrimination. 157 The court stated, "By their plain
meaning, the anti-retaliation or anti-discrimination provisions do not cover
visiting negative consequences on an employee simply because he has used
FMLA leave. Such action is, instead, covered under § 2615(a)(1), the pro-
vision governing 'Interference [with the] Exercise of Rights." ' 158 In addi-
tion, the Bachelder court stated that those courts using the term
"discriminate" to characterize such FMLA claims have done so errone-
ously; rather, the issue is one of interference with rights, and the semantic
confusion between the terms has caused many courts to apply anti-
discrimination law (i.e., the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis)
when an interference analysis is more appropriate. 159
However, the relevant regulation seems to address discrimination
rather than interference with respect to negative factor prohibition: "An
employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospec-
tive employees who have used FMLA leave.... [E]mployers cannot use
the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such
as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions." 160 To support its conclusion
156. 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000)); see also Rankin v. Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d
1145, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that former employee's FMLA claim was one based on a
substantive right under the FMLA, not one based on discrimination); Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry
Corp., 131 F.3d 711,712-13 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
159. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124 n.10. (citing Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d
791, 798 (11 th Cir. 2000); Glelen., 199 F.3d at 1368; Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319; King, 166 F.3d at 891;
Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160-61; Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
160. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005).
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that the interference provision should govern such FMLA claims, the
Bachelder court stated that although the regulation uses the term "discrimi-
nation," it refers to the interference provision. This is because another sec-
tion of that regulation states that "[a]ny violations of the Act or of these
regulations constitute interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise
of rights provided by the Act."'1 61
B. Interference Provision: Broader Protection and No Required Showing
of Intent
Not only is the interference provision the appropriate provision to
govern such FMLA claims under a statutory interpretation, but it is also the
preferable provision for claimants. Claimants alleging an adverse employ-
ment action due to taking FMLA-protected leave have broader protection
under the interference provision as compared to the discrimination provi-
sion. 162 Specifically, the discrimination provision, modeled after Title VII,
calls for an analysis under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
as discussed above and exemplified by the First and Tenth Circuits, and
sometimes the Seventh Circuit.163 On the other hand, the interference pro-
vision of the FMLA is modeled after section (8)(a)(1) of the National La-
bor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 164 In the NLRA context, the prohibition
against employer interference grants an employee broader protection rather
than the prohibition against discrimination. 165 The interference provision of
the NLRA calls for "an objective balancing of employer and employee
interests rather than a search for animus-infected discrimination," which is
necessary for a discrimination claim. 166
Therefore, in the FMLA context, use of the interference provision as
opposed to the discrimination provision grants an employee broader protec-
tion. For example, in Bachelder, the plaintiff alleged that her employer
interfered with her FMLA rights. 167 The court analogized the FMLA to the
NLRA by stating that "attaching negative consequences to the exercise of
161. Id. § 825.220(b)-(c); Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124-25.
162. See Martin H. Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 329, 349 (2003).
163. See, e.g., King, 166 F.3d at 891; Hodgens, 144 F.3dat 160-61; Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323.
164. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1123 (noting that an employer may not "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" by § 157 of the NLRA (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (2000))).
165. Malin, supra note 162, at 349-50 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,
803 (1945), which held that an employer rule against union solicitation interfered with employee rights
but did not discriminate against employees).
166. Id. at 350 (citing Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 793).
167. 259 F.3d at1124.
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protected rights surely 'tends to chill' an employee's willingness to exer-
cise those rights." 168 Given the analogy between the two Acts, the court
analyzed the FMLA claim under a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. 169 Under this standard, the plaintiff carries a lesser burden than she
would under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework because
the plaintiff need not prove intent. Hence, the first step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework places the burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, and the final step of this three-step process
places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's articulated
reason for the adverse employment action is a pretext for intentional dis-
crimination. 170 On the other hand, the Bachelder approach would require a
plaintiff to prove neither that the employer had the subjective intent to in-
terfere with FMLA rights nor that the employer's proffered reasons were
pretextual. 171
Suzy Smith's claim illustrates the benefits of the Bachelder approach.
Suzy Smith should allege her claim under the interference provision of the
FMLA instead of the discrimination provision because the interference
provision will lead to the most favorable result, namely, that Health Zone is
liable for violating the FMLA. To ensure that her claim is reviewed under
the interference provision, it is imperative that she clearly and specifically
plead her claim as one of interference. Otherwise, it may fall within the
court's discretion as to which provision to invoke and may thus lead to
unfavorable results.
If Suzy files her claim under the interference provision, she would al-
lege that her employer interfered with her right to take FMLA leave. In
evaluating a claim under this provision, Suzy need only show "sufficient"
evidence as opposed to an "overabundance of evidence" that she was enti-
tled to leave. 172 In other words, Suzy should present evidence of her five-
year service to Health Zone and her pregnancy to show that she was enti-
tled to leave under the Act. 173 In addition, Suzy must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Health Zone used her FMLA-protected leave as a
negative factor in its decision to terminate her. 174 She should argue that had
168. Id. at 1123-24 (discussing Cal. Acrylic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.
1998)).
169. Id. at 1125.
170. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
171. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1130-31; see Malin, supra note 162, at 351.
172. Rankin v. Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 2001).
173. See, e.g., Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 961 (loth Cir. 2002).
174. SeeBachelder, 259 F.3dat 1125.
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she not taken FMLA leave, she would not have been terminated.175 Suzy
Smith was the single employee terminated out of six editors, and she was
the only one who had exercised her FMLA rights within the relevant time
period.
However, if Suzy files her claim under the discrimination provision of
the FMLA, she would allege that Health Zone discriminated against her for
exercising her FMLA right to take protected leave. In this case, her claim
would be governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
in which she must show that (1) she was protected under the FMLA;
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) she was treated less
favorably than employees who did not avail themselves of the act, or she
was terminated as a result of her invocation of the act. 176 Suzy can clearly
establish this prima facie case because she took pregnancy leave protected
under the FMLA, she was subsequently terminated, and she was the only
editor who was terminated. Now, the burden shifts to Health Zone to pre-
sent a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Health Zone
has one: the magazine was undergoing a reduction in force and therefore
was required to terminate one of its employees. Because Health Zone will
most likely succeed on this point, the burden now shifts back to Suzy to
show that Health Zone's stated reason for her termination was pretextual.
Although Suzy need only prove this by a preponderance of the evidence,
the McDonnell Douglas analysis also requires that Suzy show direct intent
on behalf of her employer, a significant barrier for plaintiffs claiming em-
ployer discrimination.
Under Title VII discrimination claims, a plaintiff must show a "triable
issue of intentional discrimination."' 177 In this context, a plaintiff may prove
intentional discrimination through either direct evidence or circumstantial
evidence. 178 A plaintiff establishes direct evidence when her employer
acknowledges discriminatory intent. 179 However, a plaintiff is not required
to meet such a high burden; rather, she need only produce evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the employer discharged the
plaintiff because she was a member of a protected class. 180 Such evidence
may be in the form of circumstantial evidence, such that the discriminatory
intent may be inferred from (1) "suspicious timing, ambiguous statements
oral or written, [and] behavior toward or comments directed at other em-
175. See id. at 1125-26.
176. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
177. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1994).
178. Id. at 736.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 737.
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ployees in the protected group;"'181 (2) "evidence... that employees simi-
larly situated to the plaintiff other than in the characteristic (pregnancy, sex,
race, or whatever) on which an employer is forbidden to base a difference
in treatment received systematically better treatment;"' 182 and (3) "evidence
that the plaintiff was qualified for the job in question but passed over in
favor of (or replaced by) a person not having the forbidden characteristic
and that the employer's stated reason for the difference in treatment is un-
worthy of belief, a mere pretext for discrimination."1
83
It appears that, at least in theory, the plaintiff claiming discrimination
is given great leeway in meeting the intentional discrimination requirement.
However, in practice, plaintiffs have a difficult time prevailing on their
discrimination claims. Recent legal literature addressing this issue illus-
trates the concern for employment discrimination plaintiffs. 184 In his article
Why are Employment Discrimination Cases so Hard to Win?, Michael
Selmi points to the common misperception that employment cases are easy
to win and explains how judicial bias makes these cases difficult to win.
185
Given the influence of judicial bias, employment discrimination plaintiffs
are only 50 percent as successful when their cases are tried before a judge
as opposed to a jury, and their success rates are more than 50 percent below
the rate of other civil claims. 186 Selmi concedes, however, that the vast
number of frivolous employment discrimination claims contribute to judi-
cial bias in this context.
187
In addition to the causes listed above, there may be another significant
basis for the comparative defeat of employment discrimination claims.
Although the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework has remained
relatively unscathed since its origin in 1973, there has been great debate as
to the third step of the process, which requires that a plaintiff prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her employer's reason for discharge
was not the true reason but rather a pretext for discrimination. 188 In 2000,
181. Id. at 736 (citing Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992); Holland v.
Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1989)).
182. Id. (citing Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 728 (7th Cir. 1986)).
183. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511(1993); Ayala v. Mayfair Molded
Prods. Corp., 831 F.2d 1314, 1318 (7th Cir. 1987)).
184. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in
Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REv.539, 539 (2001); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555, 555 (2001).
185. Selmi, supra note 184, at 556, 561. For example, courts are often hostile to employment
discrimination claims because such claims are easy to bring and often lack merit.
186. Id. at 560-61.
187. Id. at 569.
188. Lanctot, supra note 184, at 540 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1972)).
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the Supreme Court decided the pivotal employment discrimination case,
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.189 This case exemplified the
Court's failure to provide a clear rule for circumstantially proving pretext,
an area of the law that was already rife with confusion and inconsis-
tency. 190 Prior to Reeves, the Court had addressed the issue on at least six
other occasions, vacillating between pretext-plus and pretext-only rules and
leaving the lower courts to their own devices in trying to make sense of and
apply the Court's decisions. 191 The confusion that resulted from these at-
tempts was exacerbated by the Reeves decision. 192
At first glance, the Reeves decision appeared to be favorable to em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs by holding that "a plaintiffs prima facie
case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated."'] 93 However, with the following qualifi-
cation, the decision created a loophole that favored defendants: "That is not
to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sus-
tain a jury's finding of liability."'1 94 The opinion then listed certain charac-
teristics that would lead to a judgment in favor of the defendant, thereby
creating what Catherine Lanctot describes as a "pretext-minus" approach in
her article Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pre-
text Cases. 195
Therefore, because of the unpredictability of lower courts' interpreta-
tions of the law in pretext cases, claimants in the FMLA context will be
better served by alleging interference as opposed to discrimination because
they will not have to jump through hoops to prove intentional discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, the courts will be better off relying on the interference
provision and applying a simple preponderance of the evidence test to
avoid the confusion surrounding proper application of pretext law.
189. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
190. Lanctot, supra note 184, at 539-40.
191. Id. at 540-44 (referring to disparate treatment cases as "pretext cases" and describing the
variations among the lower courts in applying pretext rules laid out by the Supreme Court as "pretext-
plus," "pretext-minus," and "pretext-maybe" cases).
192. See id. at 539-40, 544-45.
193. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
194. Id.
195. Lanctot, supra note 184, at 544-45 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
C. Conduct Outside the Protections of the FMLA May Interfere with
FMLA Rights
Employers may take action against conduct that does not specifically
fall within the protections of the FMLA but nevertheless interferes with
FMLA rights. In this way, the interference provision is broader than the
discrimination provision. Analogizing again to the NLRA, the plaintiff in
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. filed a claim against his employer for
terminating him because he had refused to operate what he considered to be
an unsafe truck. 196 The Administrative Law Judge determined that the
plaintiff's action was covered by § 7 of the NLRA197 and that the employer
had interfered with the plaintiffs rights under § 8(a)(1) of the Act.198 Upon
review, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had reasonably and hon-
estly invoked his right to refuse to operate an unsafe truck and that this
refusal constituted concerted activity within the meaning of § 7 of the
NLRA. 199 In a footnote to this case, the Supreme Court noted,
[U]nder § 8(a)(1) an employer commits an unfair labor practice if he or
she "interfere[s] with, [or] restrain[s]" concerted activity. It is possible,
therefore, for an employer to commit an unfair labor practice by dis-
charging an employee who is not himself involved in concerted activity,
but whose actions are related to other employees' concerted activities in
such a manner as to render his discharge an interference or restraint on
those activities. 200
In this way, a plaintiffs protection under an interference claim is
broader than that of a discrimination claim: even if his actions did not con-
stitute concerted activity, his discharge would violate his NLRA rights if
the result interfered with or restrained the "concerted activity of negotiating
or enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement."'201
The notion that conduct that might itself fall outside the ambit of an
act's protections but could nevertheless have an impact on the protected
activities of others applies in the FMLA context as well. For example, an
employer may adopt a more generous leave policy than the FMLA re-
quires, such that an employee is entitled to thirteen as opposed to twelve
196. 465 U.S. 822, 824 (1984).
197. Id. at 825 n.2, 827-28 ("Employees shall have the right to... join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000))).
198. Id. at 827-28. Under section 8 of the NLRA, an employer may not "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" by § 7 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(2000).
199. Id. at 829-30, 841.
200. Id. at 833 n.l0 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)).
201. Id.
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weeks of FMLA-protected leave. Suppose an employee availed herself of
this policy, but the employer failed to tell her that the policy was qualified:
twelve of those thirteen weeks would count against what the FMLA auto-
matically entitled the employee to. Because of this failure to notify, the
employee understood the policy to mean that she was granted thirteen
weeks of leave in addition to the twelve weeks of leave guaranteed under
the Act.
The employer's failure to notify the employee of the qualification
does not per se violate any section of the FMLA. However, this failure to
notify may ultimately harm the employee that anticipated a total of twenty-
five weeks of leave if she is terminated after she fails to return after the
thirteen weeks of leave guaranteed under her employer's policy. Not only
does this appear to interfere with her right to take FMLA-protected leave,
but it also signals to other employees at that company that they should not
take the leave they believe they are entitled to. Therefore, while the em-
ployer's conduct does not per se violate the FMLA, it can be understood to
interfere with the employees' rights under the FMLA.
Despite its cogency, the Supreme Court may have recently limited this
analysis in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.202 In this case, the
employer's leave policy granted the plaintiff thirty weeks of leave when
she was diagnosed with cancer.203 However, the employer did not notify
the plaintiff that twelve of those thirty weeks would count as FMLA
leave.204 The plaintiff requested and was denied a thirty-day extension after
the thirty weeks of leave, and she was terminated when she failed to return
to work after the thirty weeks. 205 The plaintiff filed an FMLA claim based
on the relevant regulation, which states that "if an employee takes medical
leave 'and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the
leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement.' ' 206
According to the Secretary of Labor's regulation, if an employer refuses to
grant an additional twelve weeks of leave, then the employer would be
deemed to have violated the interference provision of the FMLA, and the
employee would be entitled to damages and equitable relief.207
202. 535 U.S. 81, 89-91 (2002) (holding that employer's failure to designate leave as FMLA leave
does not interfere with employee's FMLA rights).
203. Id. at 84.
204. Id. at 85.
205. Id.
206. Id. (quoting 29 CFR § 825.700(a) (2005)).
207. Id. at 88-89.
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The Court held that this extreme position was not reasonable. 208 Al-
though it conceded that in some situations an employer's failure to desig-
nate leave will violate the interference provision, calling for additional
leave or equitable relief, the Court stated that the regulation "establishes an
irrebuttable presumption that the employee's exercise of FMLA rights was
impaired-and that the employee deserves 12 more weeks. ' 209 The Court
concluded that such a presumption was not logical. 210
Given the facts in Ragsdale, the plaintiff was not harmed by her em-
ployer's failure to give notice that its thirty-week leave policy counted
against the FMLA's guaranteed twelve weeks of leave. 211 The plaintiff had
not shown that she would have taken less leave had she been notified of her
employer's policy. 2 12 Rather, the record indicated that the plaintiff would
still have taken the entire thirty-week leave granted under her employer's
policy even if her employer had notified her that she would not be entitled
to an additional twelve weeks of leave under the FMLA.213
Therefore, although the relevant regulation may give rise to a remedy
for interference of an FMLA right in some cases, the Court determined that
the regulation erroneously presumed interference and remedial meas-
ures. 214 Although the employer's conduct may violate the FMLA by failing
to notify the employee of its leave policy, if it does not harm the plaintiff,
then it does not give rise to a remedy. 215 Because the Court in Ragsdale
focused exclusively on the plaintiff at issue and whether or not she was
actually harmed, it may have eradicated the notion that in this kind of situa-
tion, a failure to notify a single employee of leave designations interferes
with all of the employees' FMLA rights.
Regardless of whether this kind of employer conduct constitutes inter-
ference with other employees' FMLA rights, this situation begs the ques-
tion of whether the employer has the burden of notifying its employees of
its FMLA policy and, if so, to what extent. The relevant regulations have
addressed this issue, stating that the burden is on the employer to be infor-
mative about its policy.2 16 With respect to an employer who has eligible
employees and who provides written guidance (e.g., an employee hand-
208. Id. at 90.
209. Id. at 89-90.




214. Id. at 89-90.
215. Id. at 91.
216. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301 (2005).
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book) to its employees concerning employee benefits or leave, such written
guidance must include the employer's FMLA policy.2 17 More specifically,
the policy should detail employee entitlements and obligations according to
that employer's FMLA policy.2 18 On the other hand, if an employer does
not have written polices, manuals, or handbooks, the employer must never-
theless provide its employees with written guidance regarding the employ-
ees' rights and obligations under its FMLA policy. 219 These employer
policies should also explain the consequences of an employee's failure to
meet the policy's obligations, and they should provide specific notice for
certain policies including, for example, that "the leave will be counted
against the employee's annual FMLA leave entitlement. ' '220
However, the issue becomes less clear when an employer issues a
leave policy that is ambiguous. Consider the example above, in which an
employee understands her employer's FMLA policy to be one permitting a
total of twenty-five weeks of leave. Suppose the employer's policy merely
stated that each eligible employee is entitled to twelve weeks of leave un-
der the FMLA and thirteen weeks of leave under the company policy.
While the employer may have intended this to mean that the thirteen weeks
included the twelve weeks of FMLA leave, an employee may interpret the
policy to mean that she is entitled to twelve weeks of FMLA leave and an
additional thirteen weeks of leave by the company. When presented with
such an ambiguous policy, it is more difficult to determine whose burden it
is to clarify the contours of the policy. Should the courts assume that be-
cause employers are more knowledgeable, the burden remains on them?
Or, should the courts assume that if an employee seeks to avail herself of a
company entitlement and is not sure of its meaning, the burden rests upon
her to clarify? The Department of Labor has alluded to the purpose of the
regulation regarding notice requirements:
The Dumose of this Drovision is to provide emDlovees the onDor-
tunitv to learn from their emplovers of the manner in which that
emnlover intends to imnlement FMLA and what comDanv tolicies
and Drocedures are annlicable so that emDlovees mav make
FMLA olans fullv aware of their rights and obligations. It was an-
ticipated that to some large degree these policies would be pecu-
liar to that employer. 221
217. Id. at § 825.301(a)(1).
218. Id.
219. Id. § 825.301(a)(2).
220. Id. § 825.301(b)(1)(i).
221. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2080, 2219 (Jan. 6, 1995) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 825.301(a)(1) (2005)).
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While the burden should rest upon the employer to issue its leave pol-
icy in a clear and comprehensible manner, the burden should also rest upon
the employer to ensure that when an employee violates an FMLA policy,
the consequences of such a violation should parallel (i.e., be no harsher
than) those consequences imposed on employees whose similar violations
occurred outside the FMLA context.
Consider again the example above: an employee believes that her em-
ployer's leave policy grants her a total of twenty-five weeks of leave. Sup-
pose, however, that the employer's qualification was adequately included
in its employment manual and that, therefore, the employee should have
known that she was only entitled to a total of thirteen weeks of leave. In
this example, the employee is discharged at the end of her fourteenth week
of leave, one week after she exceeded the thirteen weeks to which she was
entitled. Suppose that another, non-FMLA eligible employee takes one
week of leave, to which this employee was not entitled, to go on a fishing
trip. Not only should the burden be upon the employer to clarify the con-
tours of its FMLA policy, but the employer must also insure that it treats its
employees similarly when a violation has occurred, regardless of whether
the leave was FMLA-related. Hence, if an employee is discharged for tak-
ing leave of one more week beyond her FMLA entitlement, the employee
who takes one week of impermissible leave to go on a fishing trip must be
discharged as well. Because one of the purposes of the FMLA is "to pro-
mote the goal of equal opportunity for women and men" in the workplace,
treatment among FMLA eligible and non-FMLA eligible employees must
be consistent.222
Although the above example does not confirm that employer conduct
that does not fall within the protections of the FMLA may nevertheless
interfere with FMLA rights, reasons such as statutory interpretation and
lesser burden of proof, described above, make clear that the interference
provision is preferable to the discrimination provision. Therefore, the
courts should resolve the inconsistencies in applying the Prohibited Acts
provisions to FMLA claims by analyzing such claims under the interfer-
ence provision.
CONCLUSION
The FMLA has succeeded in granting job security to individuals who
are compelled to take medical leave. Furthermore, the FMLA gives indi-
viduals a basis on which to file claims against employers who interfere
222. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2000).
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with the exercise of FMLA rights,223 or against employers who discrimi-
nate against those who have exercised FMLA rights.224 However, the cur-
rent jurisprudence in this area is so unclear that it is difficult for an
individual to know under what circumstances she is likely to prevail on a
claim alleging that her employer has used FMLA-protected leave as a nega-
tive factor in its decision to terminate her. This is difficult because some
courts use the interference provision to govern such claims, while other
courts use the discrimination provision. The end result may depend on
which provision the court chooses to invoke because each provision im-
poses a different burden on the plaintiff. Whereas the interference provision
imposes the preponderance of the evidence standard, the discrimination
provision requires a showing of intentional discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
The courts should resolve to analyze such FMLA claims under the in-
terference provision for several reasons. First, the interference provision is
broader than the discrimination provision because it does not require a
showing of pretext.225 Furthermore, the plaintiff carries a lighter burden
under this provision by only having to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that her employer used her FMLA-protected leave as a negative
factor in its decision to terminate her, without having to establish inten-
tional discrimination. As a matter of public policy, the legal system should
choose the provision with the lower burden because individuals bringing
these claims are likely less savvy than their employers. Finally, it may be
that employers' conduct that does not specifically fall within the protec-
tions of the FMLA may nevertheless give rise to an interference claim be-
cause the conduct may affect other employees' FMLA rights. A
discrimination analysis would never give rise to such a claim, and therefore
the interference claim may be broader and thus more favorable. However,
the recent Supreme Court opinion in Ragsdale may limit this notion. Above
all, the courts should be clear and consistent in analyzing such FMLA
claims, and in doing so, the interference provision should govern.
223. Id. § 2615 (a)(1).
224. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
225. See Malin, supra note 162, at 350-51 (citing Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d
1112, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2001)).

